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Loosening the Wrapper on the Sandwich Generation:
Private Compensation for Family Caregivers
The impending convergence of several demographic,
economic, and social trends in the United States . . . is
beginning to raise public concern over the need for future
long-term-care healthcare policy direction. The demographic
trends (the graying of America) are well understood.
Changing family structure, a more mobile American society,
and other economic and social trends portend a need to
recognize the role of [the] informal care giver as both a
desirable and critical component within the long-term-care
network. Decreased births and increased longevity, a steady
increase in the divorce rate, and the entry of increasing
numbers of females into the labor force may all affect the
future size and capacity of the informal care network in the
United States.'
I. INTRODUCTION
One night, when I was an arrogant teenager, I sat at the table with
my family eating dinner. As usual, I was complaining about the meal,
as well as stupid family rules like having a curfew. At the end of my
tirade, my father, unfazed, said that he could not wait until he and my
mother were older and living with me. Then, they too would
complain and express their undying ingratitude, much as I had done.
Being the ever doting daughter, I professed, "I'll just put you in a
home." Little did I know that providing care for the elderly would
become a major challenge faced by society in my adult years.
The aptly dubbed "graying of America"2 raises several concerns
regarding long-term healthcare for the elderly. We would all like to
remain healthy, active members of society, but the sad reality is that
many elderly Americans require long-term healthcare. Although the
desire to remain at home is strong among older Americans, few have
the financial resources available to finance long-term professional in-
home healthcare. As a solution, families will oftentimes attempt to
provide the services themselves, rather than utilizing professional
care.3 Thus, as will be demonstrated herein, a vast number of elderly
Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1. Thomas Jazwiecki, Long-Term Care for the Elderly in the United States,
in Caring for an Aging World, 288, 328 (Teresa Schwab ed., 1989).
2. Jazwiecki, supra note 1.
3. The focus of this comment is on in-home healthcare provided by family
members; therefore, professional healthcare is beyond the scope of this comment.
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Americans rely on family caregivers.4 Unfortunately, this option raises
significant financial concerns for those family caregivers. This
comment will present evidence that family caregivers often receive
either less than adequate compensation, or no compensation at all for
the support they provide.
A majority of states do not have legislation allowing family
caregivers to make claims against the estates of the care recipients.5
Furthermore, the cases demonstrate that a jurisprudential rule has
developed severely restricting the ability of family caregivers to recover
any compensation whatsoever. Therefore, state legislation is necessary
in order to protect the interests of these providers of care for the elderly.
Though compensation may take many forms, this comment focuses
only on monetary compensation via claims against the estates ofelderly
care recipients.6 Part II of this paper illustrates that compensation of
family caregivers is a problem that must be resolved. Part III offers a
brief discussion of public versus private incentives for family members
to provide care to their elders. Although public incentives are valuable
and necessary, they do not go far enough. Next, Part IV explores a
phenomenon referred to as the doctrine of non-recovery, including a
look at both the common law and Louisiana civil law approaches to
compensation of family caregivers. Part V examines a unique solution
to the problem adopted by the state of Illinois: a statute providing
family caregivers with an express right to file a claim against the estate
of the deceased. Finally, Part VI offers a solution that provides an
incentive to family members to continue providing long-term home
healthcare by rewarding family caregivers for their sacrifices.
II. THE NEED FOR COMPENSATION FOR FAMILY CAREGIVERS
From 1987 to 1997, the number of Americans age 65 and older
grew from 28 million to 34 million, an increase of 21%. 7 The vast
4. Throughout this comment the term "family caregiver" will be used to refer
to a family member, whether related by blood, marriage or adoption, who assists in
caring for an elderly relative. The form of care includes assistance in any number
of activities such as cooking, cleaning, bathing, and other daily chores.
5. As of the date of this writing, one state has legislation expressly allowing
family members to make such a claim. See 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/18-1.1(West 1992).
6. Although there is a possibility that family caregivers could be entitled to
compensation by virtue of being a preferred heir (for instance, someone who takes
a share of the estate before distributions to all other heirs), there is a concern that
the estate will be depleted by claims of creditors before a preferred heir is entitled
to his or her share. Therefore, this comment focuses on claims against the estate
where the family caregiver is treated as a creditor.
7. Donna L. Wagner, Comparative Analysis of Caregiver Datafor Caregivers
to the Elderly 1987 and 1997, 1 (June, 1997) available at
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majority of older Americans prefer to live their remaining days at
home, or at least outside of a nursing home.8 This desire, however,
poses many problems for a large number of our nation's elderly
population. The financial capability to obtain home healthcare is
among these concerns. The cost of providing home healthcare for the
elderly has been estimated at approximately $100 per day or about
$36,500 per year.9 For many, this is simply not feasible."
A common solution to this dilemma comes from within the
elder's family. It has been found that more than 80% of all the care
provided to older people is "informal," meaning it is provided by
family members or other unpaid volunteer caregivers in the home
rather than by professionals." As a result of the many family
members taking on the additional title of family caregiver, the
"Sandwich Generation"' 2 has emerged. Members of the Sandwich
Generation are people who have been "sandwiched" between the
responsibilities of caring for their own children still living at home
and the responsibility of caring for their aging parents. 3 This
situation raises many concerns for the caregiver, including lost
employment opportunities, financial strain, and emotional stress.' 4
It has been estimated that between 1987 and 1997 the number of
caregiving households in America grew from 7 million to more than
21 million, a staggering increase of 278%." It has also been
predicted that the number of American households providing care to
the elderly will grow to more than 39 million by the year 2007.16
http://www.caregiving.org/nacanalysis.pdf (last visited April 14, 2003).
8. A survey done by the American Association of Retired Persons reports that
85% of the respondents prefer to remain in their own homes if the need for care
arises. John Migliaccio, Neal E. Cutler, Caring Today, Planningfor Tomorrow, 14
(1999) available at http://www.caregiving.org/nacguide.pdf (last visited April 14,
2003).
9. Peter J. Losavio, Jr., Long-Term Care Planning for the Elderly, 2(November 2002) (unpublished material on file with Louisiana Law Review,
Louisiana State University). By comparison the cost of nursing home care has been
estimated to be $40,000 per year.
10. In fact, it has been estimated that 95 percent of people age 65 and over will
not be covered should the need for long-term care arise. Losavio, supra note 9, at
1.
11. Migliaccio, supra note 8, at 3.
12. See, e.g., Alison Barnes, The Policy and Politics of Community-Based
Long-Term Care, 19 Nova L. Rev. 487, 500 (Winter 1995).
13. Id.
14. See, c.f The MetLife Juggling Act Study, Balancing Caregiving with Work
and the Costs Involved (November 1999) available at
http://www.caregiving.org/JugglingStudy.pdf (last visited April 15, 2003); and
Marla Berg-Weger, Caring for Elderly Parents, The Relationship Between Stress
and Choice (Stuart Bruchey ed., 1996).
15. Wagner, supra note 7, at 1.
16. Id.
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Although this indicates that Americans are increasingly accepting
the task of caring for their elderly relatives, there is still a need to
provide further incentives for future generations to continue to
provide the much needed care. Furthermore, the nation as a whole
should recognize the significant role family caregivers play and the
sacrifices they have made, by allowing caregivers to make claims
against the estates of the care recipients.
By considering its effect on the family caregiver, one may better
understand the impact of the increase in family caregiving. One
area of concern is the employment status of the caregiver. It has
been estimated that over the next 10 years, the total number of
employed caregivers in the United States will increase to between
11 and 15.6 million working Americans, which is approximately 1
in 10 employed workers. 7 The employment status of the caregiver
can have a drastic effect on the entire family unit. A working
caregiver can "incur significant losses in career development, salary
and retirement income, and substantial out-of-pocket expenses as a
result of their caregiving obligations."' 8 The average loss of wealth
experienced by caregivers is estimated to be "substantial, averaging
$659,139 over the lifetime."' 9 In 1997 it was found that the stress
of caring for an aging friend or relative resulted in one-tenth of the
caregivers giving up work permanently.20 In addition, 11 percent
reported having taken a leave of absence, and approximately 7.3
percent reduced their hours from full-time to part-time or took a less
demanding job.2' Likewise, the period of time devoted to caring for
a family member is not always temporary, and often lasts several
years. 22
Not only do family caregivers suffer economic losses in
connection with their employment, a significant number ofcaregivers
spend their own money to provide assistance to their elderly
17. The MetLife Juggling Act Study, Balancing Caregiving with Work and the
Costs Involved 2 (Nov. 1999) available at
http://www.caregiving.org/JugglingStudy.pdf (last visited April 15, 2003).
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id. at 6 (emphasis in original).
20. This study indicates 3.6 percent took early retirement and 6.4 percent gave
up work entirely. The MetLife Study of Employer Costs for Working Caregivers 1
(June, 1997) available at http://www.caregiving.org/metlife.pdf (last visited April
15, 2003).
21. Id. at 1.
22. In fact the average duration for providing care is 4.5 years. Further, 64
percent of caregivers have provided care to their primary care recipient for less than
5 years, 21 percent have done so for 5 to 9 years, and 10 percent have provided care
for 10 years or more. Family Caregiving in the US., Findings from a National
Survey 12 (June 1997) available at http://www.caregiving.org/fmalreport.pdf (last
visited April 15, 2003).
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relatives.23 Caregivers do not always keep track of how much of their
own money they spend on caregiving during a typical month.
However, those that do keep track estimate that they spend
approximately $171 per month, which totals $1.5 billion per month
spent out-of-pocket on caregiving nationwide.24
Although the cost of providing care is significant to the caregiver,
there is a great benefit bestowed on the whole of society. A 1999
study estimates that the economic value of the services provided by
family caregivers would be close to $200 billion per year if the
services were performed by professionals." Arguably, the
government would face a tremendous financial burden if family
caregivers stopped providing care and the government was faced with
no other option than to publically fund this type of long-term
healthcare.
Finally, in 1992, surveys indicated that family support enabled
approximately 95 percent of elders to remain in the community rather
than in nursing homes.2 6 However, concerns exist with regard to the
ability and willingness of families to continue to provide this support
in conjunction with increasing needs. Most "family" care is
provided by only one family member, rather than the entire family.28
It has been reported that "societal norms .. . have created a
philosophical trend which shifts the perceived responsibility of family
care from the family to the individual, thus suggesting that caregiving
of family members is a voluntary venture.",9 Each state should
encourage family members to continue volunteering and providing
much needed and valuable support to their aging relatives, by
providing certain incentives to family caregivers. One such incentive
is compensation for the family caregiver via claims against the care
recipient's estate. This solution would also serve to reward family
members for voluntarily taking on this demanding job.3"
23. Id.
24. Id. at 24.
25. The MetLife Study of Employed Caregivers: Does Long Term Care
Insurance Make a Difference? 1 (March 2001) available at
http://www.caregiving.org/LTC%20study%2Ofinal.pdf(last visited April 15,2003).
26. Berg-Weger, supra note 14, at 10.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. There is a concern regarding persons who take advantage of the elderly in
their old age by unduly influencing the elder to turn over assets to a purported
caregiver. These abusive caregivers are not the topic of this paper. This paper
focuses on family members who provide adequate and valuable nursing and other
services to an elderly relative. The topic of undue influence, although it is a valid
concern, is outside the scope of this comment.
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Ill. A BRIEF LOOK AT PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE COMPENSATION
A. Examples ofPublic Funding ofFamily Caregiver Compensation31
When considering public funding for long-term healthcare, many
Americans immediately think of Medicare or Medicaid. Many older
Americans in need of long-term healthcare may be faced with a
financial crisis because of a misunderstanding of these programs. A
common misconception among older Americans is that financing of
long-term healthcare is provided by Medicare and Medicaid.32 This
assumption is incorrect. Programs such as Medicare "provide very
little financial assistance for long-term healthcare, especially in the
home."33 In fact, "Medicare does not pa for the typical long-term
care support services most people need. ' ' 4
With reference to Medicaid, there are strict financial guidelines,
and even if these guidelines are met, Medicaid provides only minimal
support for nursing home costs and nothing for home healthcare.35 If
people who have depleted their financial resources require long-term
nursing home care, Medicaid may pay these bills.3 To meet the
financial requirements for Medicaid, the person must show that she
has what Medicaid deems insufficient financial resources, usually less
than $2,000.3' These misconceptions are "part of the reason why
family caregivers step in when needed, often providing multiple care
services for a much longer period than they anticipated. ' 31
One emerging public incentive for the family caregiver is a tax
incentive at the state level, in the form of tax exemptions, tax credits,
and tax deductions.39 Policymakers enacted the various tax incentives
believing that many Americans choose not to assist family members
even though they possess the means to do so.4° Policymakers hoped
to increase the number of family caregivers and avoid the need to
31. Although public funding is important, an expansive discussion of it is
outside the scope of this comment. However, its existence bears on the theme of
this comment and is, therefore, relevant for at least a minor discussion. For a more
expansive discussion see Nathan L. Linsk, et al., Wages for Caring: Compensating
Family Care of the Elderly (1992).
32. Losavio, supra note 9, at 1.
33. Migliaccio, supra note 8, at 3.
34. Id. at 5.
35. Nathan L. Linsket al., Compensation of Family Care for the Elderly, in
Family Caregiving in an Aging Society 64, 74 (Rosalie A. Kane & Joan D. Penrod
eds. 1995).
36. Migliaccio, supra note 8, at 5.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Linsk, supra note 35, at 64-65.
40. Id. at 65.
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expand government programs.4 One criticism of this option is that
it does not bestow the benefit on the most needy.4 2 The tax incentives
most often benefit higher income families rather than lower income
families. 3 Higher income families can more readily afford to hire
long-term healthcare from outside the family, thereby decreasing the
need for the family caregiver. Moreover, the tax plans are complex
and expensive to administer, and it is difficult for policymakers to
place an exact dollar figure on volunteered services. 4 Additionally,
many of the programs require the family members to live in the same
household in order to take advantage of the tax incentives.45 This
option is sometimes undesirable for families, and can lead to the most
stressful caregiving situations.4' Finally, tax plans often assume that
all household members are employed, thereby excluding families of
retirees from the programs.47
A second public incentive is direct compensation to family
caregivers through wages or cash grants from the state government,
which can take many forms such as direct cash or voucher payments
to families.48 An unrestricted cash grant allows consumers to use the
funds for any purpose, which may or may not include the purchase of
home healthcare services.49 Methods for paying relatives have ranged
from hiring family members to work as employees of existing
community service programs, to giving allowances to elderly clients
so that they may directly purchase their own services.5  Each
arrangement differs in the amount of control given to homecare
agencies, clients, and families.5 On the other hand, a restricted
voucher is used only for a specific type of service.5 2 Unfortunately,
grants have usually been in the form of restricted cash grants or
vouchers.53
Although cash grants and vouchers offer a promising incentive,
strict limitations are often attached.54 One such limitation exists with
Medicaid wherein the regulations "prohibit the payment of relatives
41. Id.
42. Linsk, supra note 31, at 13.
43. Linsk, supra note 35, at 65.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Linsk, supra note 35, at 15.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Linsk, supra note 35, at 74.
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through the definition of Personal Care Services."" In addition to
federal prohibitions on direct compensation to family members, many
states offer their own prohibitions.56 Even where there is a possibility
of direct compensation, the payments to relatives are typically restricted
to very specific circumstances where the care recipient is at a high risk
of requiring institutionalization.57 Also, in some jurisdictions,
payments are restricted by a program's locus in one particular agency
and the program's reliance on certain funding sources.58 Restrictions
on funding range from total consumer discretion in hiring the caregiver
to complete state agency management of home healthcare.59 Other
examples of restrictions include living arrangements of the caregiver
and care recipient,' qualities of the caregiver,6' whether the caregiver
meets welfare guidelines,62 whether the caregiver is employed, 6 - and
whether the caregiver is licensed or screened.' A combination of all
of these restrictions makes public funding for direct compensation seem
like only a hope rather than a viable solution.65 Therefore, a need arises
for private funding of home healthcare.
55. Id. Medicaid regulations provide that "personal care services" are:
services furnished to an individual who is not an inpatient or
resident ofa hospital, nursing facility, intermediate care facility for
the mentally retarded, or institution for mental disease that are-
(1) Authorized for the individual by a physician in accordance
with a plan of treatment or (at the option of the State) otherwise
authorized for the individual in accordance with a service plan
approved by the State;
(2) Provided by an individual who is qualified to provide such
services and who is not a member of the individual's family; and
(3) Furnished in a home, and at the State's option, in another
location.
42 C.F.R. § 440.167(a) (2001) (emphasis added).
56. Linsk, supra note 35 at 74.
57. Id. at 75.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 78. Specifically, whether the caregiver and the care recipient are
members of the same household.
61. Id. One example given indicated that a family caregiver would only be
compensated if another caregiver, who spoke the same language as the care
recipient, could not be found.
62. Id. at 79.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. For a more expansive discussion on public funding for family caregiving
see Linsk, supra note 31. Arguably, public funding will be crucial for low income
families facing poverty, and therefore, should be expanded. However, the focus of
this comment is on private funding for family care, particularly in middle class
families. The use of an individual's assets to provide incentives to family members
will avoid a drain on the national economy that public funding of all caregiving
arguably will entail. See Part II above regarding the costs of caregiving.
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B. Private Funding
In addition to the public funding for long-term home healthcare
for the elderly, private funding options are emerging. Two such
options are long-term healthcare insurance and the reverse mortgage.
Although both of these options are promising solutions, each has its
drawbacks.
Long-term healthcare insurance is costly.' Even if long-term
healthcare insurance is feasible for elderly people or their families,
the role of the family caregiver does not disappear. Studies show that
insurance-financed benefits do not replace significant amounts of
family caregiving.67 On average, working caregivers spend only
slightly fewer hours per week with the care recipient than caregivers
caring for the uninsured.68 This suggests that for the most part,
insurance-financed care is not an adequate substitute for family
caregiving.69
Another solution to providing long-term home healthcare is the
reverse mortgage. A reverse mortgage differs from a traditional
mortgage in that the lending institution calculates the value of a
persons' home and then pays the home owner in either monthly
installments or a lump sum for the home's value.7" The loan is not
repaid as long as the homeowner lives in the home.7 However, the
loan must be repaid when the homeowner permanently moves, sells
the house, dies, or reaches the end of the pre-selected loan term.72
Home equity is the largest asset of older people in the United States
today.73 The advantage of the reverse mortgage is that it puts cash
directly in the hands of the elderly. These funds might be used to pay
for medical and home care bills." Though the reverse mortgage may
provide substantial financial aid, it also suffers from several
drawbacks.
66. Barnes, supra note 12, at 524.
67. The MetLife Study of Employed Caregivers: Does Long Term Care
Insurance Make a Difference?, supra note 25, at 3.
68. Id. The caregiver of a person with insurance spent on average 24 hours per
week rather than 27 hours per week with the care recipient. Id.
69. Id.
70. See cf, Understanding Reverse Mortgages, available at
http://www.aarp.org/revmort (last visited April 15, 2003); "Fast Facts "from the
Federal Trade Commission, Reverse Mortgages, (October 1993), available at
http://www.hsh.com/pamphlets/rms.html (last visited April 15, 2003).
71. Id.
72. "Fast Facts "from the Federal Trade Commission, Reverse Mortgages,
(October 1993), available at http://www.hsh.com/pamphlets/rms.htrrl (last visited
April 15, 2003).
73. Migliaccio, supra note 8, at 21-22.
74. Id. at 22.
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With the reverse mortgage, a third party lender enters the picture.
Although the loan does not have to be repaid immediately, the lender
gains a security interest in the home which can be asserted against the
heirs after the death of the homeowner.75 The family has the option to
pay off the mortgage and keep the home but, if they cannot, it is
possible the home will be sold to a third party to satisfy the debt,
thereby taking the home away from the family. A better option would
be to allow care recipients to keep their home, unencumbered by a
mortgage, and to use this valuable asset as encouragement for family
members to provide care by promising compensation from the estate.
Assuming it is more cost effective for family members to provide
nursing care by rendering services at a lower cost than professionals
would charge, avoiding the use of a reverse mortgage would preserve
more of the estate for the family. Likewise, allowing the family
members to render care with the promise of later compensation is more
likely to reduce the chances of a third party taking possession of the
family home and selling it to pay off the mortgage. It is better to avoid
such a risk and encourage family members to render the necessary care,
while leaving open the possibility of later compensation from the
estate. This would allow the heirs to protect their inheritance while still
providing much needed and valuable care for their aging relatives.
C. A Combination of Private and Public Incentives
Regardless of the effectiveness of each of the previously discussed
public funding solutions, they do not exist in all states and are therefore
of limited consequence to the nation as a whole. Additionally, public
funding as an exclusive solution could substantially drain the states'
economies. Moreover, the exclusive reliance on public funding
overlooks the more immediate and obtainable compensation
alternative: private funding of family caregiving via claims against the
estate of the care recipient.
Ultimately, a combination of both public and private incentives is
the most desirable solution for providing compensation to family
caregivers. This is primarily because a combination of public and
private compensation will provide compensation for low income
families as well as higher income families. Some elders have assets to
distribute upon death, and therefore claims against an estate are a
feasible source of compensation in these situations. However, others
will die in poverty, leaving their family caregivers with nothing in the
way of compensation. In this regard, public funding is the only source
of compensation for the caregiver.
75. See, c.f Understanding Reverse Mortgages, available at http://
www.aarp.org/revmortl (last visited April 15, 2003).
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IV. THE DOCTRINE OF NON-RECOVERY
A. The Origins of the Doctrine of Non-Recovery
What this comment refers to as the doctrine of non-recovery
might also be labeled "the family member rule. 76 The doctrine of
non-recovery is a jurisprudential rule in contract theory, whereby
courts presume that services provided by family members have been
rendered gratuitously if there is no express contract." Accordingly,
there is no consideration for the alleged contract and therefore it is
unenforceable without express proof."
In addition, when dealing with implied contracts, there is a
general presumption in American jurisprudence that when a person
renders services to another under circumstances which suggest an
expectation of payment, a contract will be implied and the person
rendering the services is entitled to recover the value of those
services." However, a person that renders services to a blood relative
is faced with a much different presumption. Where the parties are
related, especially if the relationship is that of parent and child, the
presumption is reversed. In this situation, it is presumed that the
services were rendered in consideration of love and affection and
without expectation of payment.80 The claimant must demonstrate by
"clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence,"'" that an express or
implied agreement existed providing for compensation for the
services." This burden of proof is very strong, making it nearly
impossible for a family member to recoup the value of his services
from the estate of the decedent.
The doctrine of non-recovery originated in the middle of the
nineteenth century."' The doctrine was originally justified on two
grounds. The first was that services rendered in a household where
a reciprocity of benefits existed were intended to be gratuitous.
Under this justification, courts noted that households functioned as a
76. Jonathan S. Henes, Compensating Caregiving Relatives: Abandoning the
Family Member Rule in Contracts, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 705 (1996).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., Contracts to Devise or Gift Property in Exchangefor
Lifetime Home Care - Latent and Insidious Abuse of Older Persons, 12 Prob. L.J.
1(1994).
80. Matter of Estate of Wilson, 178 A.D.2d 996, 997 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991)
(citing In re Adams Estate, 1 A.D.2d 259 (N.Y. App. Div. 1956); In re Schultz'
Estate, 18 Misc.2d 1012 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1959); In re Basten's Estate, 204 Misc 937
(N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1953). See also Kruse, supra note 79.
81. Matter of Estate of Wilson, 178 A.D.2d 996, 997 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
82. Id.
83. See Henes, supra note 76, at 706-07.
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system of mutual convenience, whereby family members contributed to
the entire household without an expectation of payment." Accordingly,
services were not rendered in expectation of payment, but rather in
expectation of corresponding benefits of services rendered by other
family members.8 5
The second justification was that public policy required a rule that
would safeguard the inner-workings of the household.8 6 Under this
reasoning, courts justified the doctrine as protecting the "sanctity" of the
household by discouraging family members from turning to litigation to
settle their disputes; litigation would disrupt the entire household.'
Although both justifications had their place in the nineteenth century
household, modem courts refuse to recognize that this model is no longer
appropriate, and they continue to apply this archaic rule.
The family of the nineteenth century often consisted of many
generations living in the same household throughout their lives.88 In
these households, all family members shared responsibility for the chores
necessary for the daily running of the home. However, the United
States, which started as a rural, agricultural based society, is now an
urban, industrial nation.9" As a result, the extended family living in the
same household has become obsolete for many of today's American
families.9' Families have begun to rely on outside sources to provide the
benefits that were once received from large extended families. Also, the
number of services performed by members within the household has
dramatically decreased.92 Despite the dynamics of the American family
having changed in modem times, courts continue to apply the
presumption of gratuity when faced with a claim for compensation for
services rendered between family members, in effect creating a doctrine
of non-recovery. Therefore, state legislation is required to overcome this
deeply imbedded jurisprudential rule which bars family members from
obtaining compensation for family caregiving.
B. Common Law
In common law jurisdictions, when a person performs services in
favor of an unrelated individual, and the recipient is aware of and accepts
the benefit, the law will imply a promise on the part of the recipient to
84. Id. at 709.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 708.
87. Id. at 710.
88. Henes, supra note 76, at 714.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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repay the caregiver.9 3 However, a different rule applies when the person
rendering services and the person receiving services are related. In such
a situation, the law implies that the services were rendered gratuitously,
the recipient is under no obligation to pay for the services rendered."
Due to varying fact patterns among the cases, no definitive rule
on the doctrine of non-recovery has emerged. However, some basic
principles are constant throughout the jurisprudence. In ruling on
claims for compensation for family caregiving services, the courts
tend to look for a "family-like" relationship as well as a "mutuality of
benefits.""5
1. The "Family-like" Relationship
Courts have found that if a close kinship relationship exists
between the decedent and the caregiver, a presumption exists that the
services were rendered gratuitously.96 For claims asserted by the
caregiver to be sustained, this presumption must be overcome. It has
been stated that "[t]he maxim is this: a person cannot provide an
unsolicited kindness to kin and thereafter make the kindness a matter
of claim against the donee."97 In fact, the courts have gone beyond
actual kinship and looked to a "family-like" relationship. It is the
intimacy of this actual, family-like relationship that creates the burden
of proving either by implied contract or in equity that payment is
legally justified.98
In Estate of Dodson,99 the court extended the "family-like"
relationship to co-habitants. It outlined several factors used to
determine what constitutes a family: (1) there must be a social status,
(2) there must be a head who has a right, at least in a limited way, to
direct and control those gathered into the household, (3) the head
must be obligated either legally or morally to support the other
members, and (4) there must be a corresponding state of at least
partial dependence of the other members for this support.'0° Dodson
involved a co-habitating couple; therefore, no kinship existed. The
claimant sought recovery for services rendered in connection with the
decedent's cattle business and for cooking, cleaning, and entertaining
93. Clifton B. Kruse, Jr., The Effect of Relational Intimacy on Estate Claims,
21 Colo. Law. 699 (1992).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Kruse, Jr., supra note 93.
99. Estate of Dodson, 878 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
100. Id. at 515.
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business clients.'0 ' She testified that she had never held herself out
to be the decedent's wife, although they had lived together for some
time.)° Nonetheless, the court found a "family-like" relationship
by analyzing the four factors outlined above.0 3 The woman was not
allowed to recover for the value of the services rendered.' °4
Moreover, the court did not address the fact that no actual kinship
relationship existed. The woman was not an heir and could not
recover from the estate unless there was a provision in the
deceased's will which provided for her. By labeling her as
"family," it also barred the use of the general presumption of
implied contracts whereby a person accepting a benefit is presumed
to intend payment for services rendered. As a result she received
nothing in the form of compensation.
2. The Mutuality of Benefits
Another factor that courts rely on in finding the presumption of
gratuity is a mutuality of benefit and burden. The presumption
assumes mutuality of benefit and burden within the family unit.'0 5
For example, a family member might benefit by sharing expenses
by living together and splitting costs, but he or she will also have
the burden of performing daily chores, such as cooking and cleaning
for the mutual benefit of the other members of the household. In
other words, the presumption is based on a theory that every
member of a household will suffer a burden while simultaneously
benefitting from the labor of other family members. However, the
rule is not relevant in cases where there is neither a close
association nor a community of interest in the family.' 6 Where
family members have been living separate and apart for an extended
period of time, the presumption's essential inference is missing; the
parties no longer enjoy a "mutuality of benefits." Thus, a court
upheld a daughter's claim against her father's estate for services
rendered when there had been a fifty-year separation prior to the
rendering of care.0 7 On the other hand, under the "mutuality of
benefits" policy, a child who has always lived with his or her
parents will have a harder time proving that the services were not
101. Id. at 516. This case is not presented for the discussion on the type of
services rendered, rather for its focus on the "family-like" relationship as a bar to
the recovery of compensation for any services rendered.
102. Id. at 516-517.
103. Estate of Dodson, 878 S.W.2d 513, 518 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
104. Id.
105. Kruse, supra note 93.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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rendered gratuitously than a child who has lived separately from the
parent and returned home to render care.
In Drisbrow v. Durand, 'o the sister of the decedent had rendered
housekeeping services for many years prior to her brother's death. The
court held that the presumption of gratuity applies to brothers and sisters,
as well as to children and parents, because of the mutual benefits
experienced by each member of the household. " The New Jersey Court
of Appeals reasoned that family members who live in the same
household participate in mutual acts of kindness for the convenience of
all household members, and these acts are performed gratuitously,
however, where the members are not of the same household the
implication does not arise, because the underlying presumption is
missing."'
3. Problems with the Common Law Scheme
One might first look to contract theory in determining whether a
family member will be compensated for providing services to an elder
relative in need. Generally, a contract to will property in exchange for
services is valid and enforceable."' The Uniform Probate Code
provides: "[a] contract to make a will or devise... can be established
only by (1) provisions of a will stating material provisions of the
contract; (2) an express reference in a will to a contract and extrinsic
evidence proving the terms of the contract; or (3) a writing signed by the
decedent evidencing the contract."' 2 The Georgia Supreme Court also
recognized that contracts to will property have been upheld in America
from the earliest times and the validity of these contracts seems to be
beyond all doubt." 3 However, this general rule does not hold true in all
situations.
Contracts to will property in exchange for services are also valid
and enforceable when they concern family members," 4 but there is an
additional hurdle to overcome when dealing with such situations.
108. 24 A. 545 (N.J. 1892).
109. Id. at 546.
110. Id. The court held that;
... the ordinary rule is that the household family relationship is
presumed to abound in reciprocal acts of kindness and good will,
which tend to the mutual comfort and convenience of the members
of the family, and are gratuitously performed; and, where that
relationship appears, the ordinary implication of a promise to pay
for services does not arise, because the presumption which
supports such implication is nullified by the presumption that
between members of a household services are gratuitously
rendered.
111. See Kruse, supra note 79 at y.
112. Unif. Prob. Cd. § 2-701 (amended 1997).
113. Kruse, supra note 79; Mann v. Moseley, 67 S.E.2d 128, 129 (Ga. 1951).
114. Kruse, supra note 79 at 5; Unif. Prob. Cd. § 2-701 (amended 1997).
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Although contracts between family members are valid and
enforceable, express contracts rarely exist in family situations. How
often, if ever, do relatives sit down and hammer out express contracts
for services, let alone put the agreement in writing to offer proof that
it exists? Case law reporters are replete with examples of family
members attempting to collect the value of the services rendered,
indicating that these written contracts rarely exist. 15 In each case, the
family caregivers are attempting to overcome the presumption of
gratuity, because no express written contract exists. Contract
negotiations on an express written contract of this sort would
arguably put family members in an awkward situation and could lead
to animosity. Thus, it is not hard to imagine why such contracts are
infrequent.
Another problem occurs with respect to the timing of a claim. A
caregiver is at a significant disadvantage when asserting a claim after
the care recipient dies rather than before. In fact, "[flailure to assert
a claim until after the decedent beneficiary's death will weigh heavily
against the claimant where the claimant is a member of the decedent's
family."" 6 Apparently, the family caregiver must demand payment
before the beneficiary's death. But, such a demand is often not
reasonable, especially since the care recipient likely does not have the
cash available to pay for the care. If they did have such assets, they
would be less likely to need a family caregiver. As noted in Part II
above, the single largest asset of the elderly are their homes.
Therefore, a demand for payment before death may require the care
recipient to sell their home. A person who is concerned enough to
care for an elderly family member should not be required to put the
elderly relative out of his or her house in order to obtain
compensation. State legislation which allows for a claim upon the
estate after the care recipient dies is a much better option.
115. See, c.f Smith v. Milligan, 43 Pa. 107 (Pa. 1862); Hall v. Finch, 29 Wis.
278 (Wis. 1871); Marietta v. Marietta, 57 N.W. 708 (Iowa 1894); McWhorter v.
Pitman's Adm'r, 245 S.W. 133 (Ky. 1922); Lucius' Adm'r v. Owen, 248 S.W. 495
(Ky. 1923); Nissen v. Flournoy, 254 S.W. 540 (Ark. 1923); In Re Collins' Estate,
83 Pa. Super. 31 (Pa. Super. 1924); Larson v. Larson, 201 N.W. 420 (Minn. 1924);
Witte v. Smith, 152 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. Ct. App. 1941); Maasdam v. Massdam's
Estate, 24 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1946); Osborne v. Boatmen's Nat. Bank of
Springfield, 732 S.W.2d 242 (Mo. Ct. App.1987); Kohler v. Armstrong, 758 P.2d
407 (Or. Ct. App. 1988); Estate of Jesmer v. Rohlev, 609 N.E.2d 816 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993); In Re Estate of Rollins, 645 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); In Re Estate
of Lutz, 620 N.W.2d 589 (N.D. 2000). This is merely a sample of reported cases
in which family members did not have written contracts for services or written
contracts to will property. It is evident from the above that from the mid 1800's,
until as late as 2000, family members simply were not entering written contracts to
provide services.
116. Kruse, supra note 93.
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C. The Civil Law in Louisiana
The doctrine of non-recovery in Louisiana dates back to the
1800's, and it has been stated that until 1949, Louisiana cases were
in accord with the common law."'7 However, three major themes are
now prevalent in the Louisiana approach, in addition to the general
presumption of gratuity in the common law approach. The success
of obtaining compensation will turn on: 1) whether the parent is "in
need;" 2) whether a child rendering care is an only child; and, 3)
whether the caregiver is a collateral relative.
1. Parents "In Need" and Only Children
For purposes of recovering expenses of caregiving by a child to
his elderly parent, one factor that Louisiana courts look to is whether
the parent is "in need.""'  In 1866, in Estate of Oliver,"9 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that a child who renders services to a
parent has a right of contribution from his or her siblings. 20 In
Oliver, a son had "supplied [his mother] with what she needed"'' for
12 years before her death. The court held that the son was entitled to
contribution from his 9 siblings because his mother was "in need"
when he provided for her.'22
On the other hand, more than 20 years later, in Succession of
Guidry,'23 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that when a child
renders services to a parent in need, the child is repaying a debt to the
parent and thus is not entitled to a claim against the estate as a
creditor. In Guidry, a mortgage creditor challenged a daughter-in-
law's claim for compensation for board, lodging, nursing and other
services which she rendered to her mother-in-law for two years during
her last illness. The claimant was also the wife of the executor of the
estate. The court found that the claim actually belonged to the son,
117. R.H.G., Jr., Successions - Presumption of Gratuity of Services Rendered
by Child to Parent-Art. 229, La. Civil Code of 1870,23 Tul. L. Rev. 292 (1948).
118. La. Civ. Code art. 229 provides;
Children are bound to maintain their father and mother and other
ascendants, who are in need, and the relatives in the direct
ascending line are likewise bound to maintain their needy
descendants... limited to life's basic necessities of food, clothing,
shelter, and health care, and [the obligation] arises only upon proof
of inability to obtain these necessities by other means or from
other sources.
119. 18 La. Ann. 594 (1866).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. 40 La. Ann. 671, 4 So. 893 (1888).
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who was the executor, not his wife, and that he was not entitled to
compensation because he was discharging a debt owed to his mother
who was in "penurious circumstances.'
'1 4-
Several years later the Court returned to the prior holdings granting
caregivers compensation if the recipient is in need. In Succession of
Templeman125 a daughter nursed her mother who was bedridden and
suffering from a broken hip for more than 11 months before she died.
The daughter made a claim for nursing and other personal services, as
well as a separate claim for feeding the stock. The court held that
children who care for an "indigent" parent are entitled to a contribution
from coheirs, each for their virile share. 26 The court found that the
mother was "amply" able to support herself and therefore the daughter
was not entitled to a claim for contribution from the coheirs.127
Therefore, under Templeman, the child is entitled to compensation in
the form of contribution from siblings when services are rendered to a
parent "in need."
In Muse v. Muse, the court was faced with a child who had
rendered services to his mother. The services were characterized as
manual labor performed on two farms and were performed for
approximately 8 years before his mother's death. The court found that
the mother was not in need because she owned 15 acres of land in her
own right as well as a usufruct over 120 additional acres.19 Therefore,
the son was not entitled to contribution from his 11 siblings, reinforcing
the holding in Templeman that children of parents who are "in need"
are entitled to contribution from siblings, but children of parents who
are not "in need" are not entitled to contribution.130
In Latour v. Guillory,13' the court looked to Guidry and clarified
that the obligation of children to support a parent in need is solidary.
Therefore, a child who has more money than his siblings is not required
to contribute more to the parent; the debt is distributed equally among
the children. 3 1
The above cases indicate a strong presumption that children who
render services to a parent are doing so gratuitously. 3 3 However,
124. Guidry, 40 La. Ann. at 673, 4 So. at 895.
125. 134 La. 798, 64 So. 718 (1914).
126. Templeman, 134 La. at 799, 64 So. at 718.
127. Id. at 799-800, 64 So. at 718.
128. 215 La. 238, 40 So.2d 21 (1949).
129. Muse, 215 La. at 241, 40 So.2d at 22.130. The court also found the facts of Templeman to be parallel, where the child
had rendered nursing services, thereby implying that services rendered may be
personal or domestic, as well as manual labor. Muse, 215 La. at 243, 40 So.2d at
23.
131. 134 La. 332, 340, 64 So. 130, 133 (1914).
132. Id.
133. Farrar v. Johnson, 172 La. 30, 133 So. 352 (1931).
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when a parent is found to be in necessitous circumstances pursuant
to Civil Code article 229, the child rendering services is entitled to
a claim for contribution from his or her coheirs. 134 The claim is
limited to contribution from coheirs, and the caregiver is not
entitled to a claim against the estate.135 Consequently, an only child
of a parent who is "in need" will have no siblings from whom to
seek contribution. Arguably, the estate will be distributed to all
creditors before the child is entitled to his or her share as an heir.
Accordingly, the best method to provide compensation to an only
child of a parent "in need" is to make them a creditor of the estate
via a claim as a family caregiver. If the child is a creditor, he or she
will stand on equal footing with all other creditors rather than being
relegated to taking what is left in the estate after all creditors have
been paid, which is likely to be nothing if the parent is insolvent.
2. Children vs. Collateral Relatives
In Succession of Dugas,3 1 the Louisiana Supreme Court held
that the presumption of gratuity, particularly when services are
rendered to a person in "necessitous circumstances," does not apply
between brothers and sisters. ' The court's reasoning was based on
the fact that collateral relatives have no legal obligation to support
each other, 38 unlike children who have a duty to support a parent
"in need" pursuant to Article 229.'9 However, the court stated that
each case should be decided "on its particular[s]" rather than by a
general rule." 1
In Dugas, the deceased was a deaf, mute and blind woman.
For approximately 17 years before her death, her sister took care of
her. When her sister sought compensation for those services, the
other heirs of the deceased challenged the claim. The court, in
strong language, chastised the heirs stating,
We think therefore, that instead of claimant's claim coming
"with poor grace," as contended by counsel for the
opponent, it comes with poor grace for this opponent, who
refused to help her afflicted sister during these many years,
to oppose the claim of the sister who was willing to do so
134. Succession of Guidry, 40 La. Ann. 671, 673-74, 4 So. 893, 895 (1888).
135. Muse v. Muse, 215 La. 238,40 So.2d 21 (1949).
136. Succession of Dugas, 215 La. 13, 39 So.2d 750 (1949).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. La. Civ. Code art. 229. See supra footnote 117, for full text of the article.
140. Succession of Dugas, 215 La. 13, 39 So. 2d 750 (1949).
141. Id.
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and who, in this way, relieved the opponent of any
responsibility in the matter. 14
2
The court decided Dugas and Muse, 43 which denied recovery to a
child, on the same day, thereby confirming its position that collateral
relatives and children should be treated differently.
3. Problems with the Civil Law Approach
Throughout the cases the Louisiana courts fail to define "in need."
In Guidry the court found that the son did not have a claim for
contribution because his mother was in "necessitous" or "penurious"
circumstances.' 4 It made no other indication as to what assets or
income she had at the time the services were rendered. It was simply
a statement of fact with no evidence given to assist in later cases.
Further, in Muse the care recipient was found not to be "in need"
because she was the owner of 15 acres of land and also owned an
undivided one-half interest and a usufruct over 120 more acres of
land, all of which were unencumbered. 45 The court did not say if the
land produced any income for the care recipient. Nor did the court
indicate the value of the land. In Succession of Templeman, 146 a
daughter who rendered nursing services to her mother was not
allowed a claim for contribution from her siblings because her mother
was not "in need," again without any reference to the mother's assets
or income.
Another problem in the civil law approach is that it treats
collateral relatives differently from children. Although the court
should be applauded for moving away from the presumption of
gratuity, there is no reason to treat collateral relatives differently from
immediate relatives, such as children. The courts focus on Article
229's requirement to maintain ascendents and descendants. 47
However, all relatives suffer losses of some kind when rendering
family care. These losses are suffered regardless of the nature of the
blood kinship between the caregiver and the recipient. Therefore, all
relatives should be compensated for rendering care and services.
Finally, the civil law approach in Louisiana results in some very
harsh results for only children. Where a child has siblings and is able
to prove that the parent is "in need," the child will at least be assured
a claim for contribution against any siblings. However, if a parent
142. Dugas, 215 La. at 22, 30 So.2d at 753.
143. Muse, 215 La. 238, 40 So.2d 21.
144. Estate of Guidry, 40 La. Ann. 671, 4 So. 893 (1888).
145. Muse v. Muse, 215 La. 238, 40 So.2d 21 (1949).
146. Templeman, 134 La. 798, 64 So. 718 (1914).
147. See c.f Estate of Oliver, 18 La. Ann. 594 (1866).
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dies insolvent or with property that is heavily encumbered, the only
child will receive nothing for the rendering of these most valuable
services.
Like the common law approach, the presumption of gratuity is
also strong and deeply rooted in Louisiana jurisprudence. Therefore,
the best solution for family caregivers is state legislation that allows
for a claim against the decedent's estate for the value of the services
rendered.
V. THE ILLINOIS SOLUTION
A. The Statute and the Court's Interpretation
In 1988, the Illinois legislature enacted a unique statute which
allows for a family caregiver to make a claim against the estate of the
decedent if specific requirements are met." When originally
enacted, 149 the statute provided that a spouse, parent, brother, or sister
of a disabled person could make a claim against the estate of the
decedent." 0 The statute was amended in 1992 to also allow children
of the disabled person to make a claim against the estate upon death
of the care recipient.' 5' Legislative history indicates that children
148. 1988 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 85-1417 (West).
149. The legislature considered passing this statute as a means to protect a
custodial parent if a child were permanently injured and not able to make a last will
and testament. The legislature expressed concern that the custodial parent may
expend more time in the caring for the child and therefore, as a matter of fairness,
would be entitled to a greater portion of the child's estate. However, when the
statute was passed it was written much more broadly and will arguably allow for
claims by most family members against the estates of elderly relatives. See
Statutory Custodial Claims: S. Tr. on H.B. 4116, 85th Gen. Assemb. at 54 (Dec. 1,
1988).
150. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/18-1.1 (West 1992).
151. The statute now provides:
Any spouse, parent, brother, sister, or child of a disabled person
who dedicates himself or herself to the care of the disabled person
by living with and personally caring for the disabled person for at
least 3 years shall be entitled to a claim against the estate upon the
death of the disabled person. The claim shall take into
consideration the claimant's lost employment opportunities, lost
lifestyle opportunities, and emotional distress experienced as a
result of personally caring for the disabled person. The claim shall
be in addition to any other claim, including without limitation a
reasonable claim for nursing and other care. The claim shall be
based upon the nature and extent of the person's disability and, at
a minimum but subject to the extent of the assets available, shall
be in the amounts set forth below:
1. 100% disability, $100,000
2. 75% disability, $75,000
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were added to the statute simply because they had been
inadvertently omitted in the original statute.152 The statute requires
the family caregiver to "dedicate"' themselves to the care of the
disabled person and also requires that they "live with"'54 the care
recipient. The court is to consider a number of factors, such as lost
employment opportunities, and the amount of compensation
awarded will depend on the severity of the care recipient's
disability.'
There has been relatively little case law interpreting the Illinois
statute. However, in Estate ofHoehn, 15 6 an Illinois Appellate Court
did not allow the sister of the decedent who had filed a claim
against the estate to recover because she did not "live with the
decedent."' 57 The sisters were both retired and lived in the same
apartment building across the hall from one another. According to
the court, the "live with" requirement of the statute was not
ambiguous - it required that the caregiver and the recipient share the
same household. The court also held that because the sister was
retired, she did not suffer lost employment opportunities, and her
lifestyle did not change much when living across the hall from her
sister.'59 Perhaps the most damaging fact for the caregiver was that
she failed to meet the three-year time requirement. She had
rendered care to her sister for one and one-half years before her
sister moved into a nursing home. The statute explicitly provides
that the caregiver must provide care for at least three years, and she
failed to meet this requirement."
The Illinois appellate courts are split over the interpretation of
the Illinois statute. In Estate ofRollins, 161 the court disagreed with
the Hoehn court's interpretation of the statute. As stated by the
Rollins court,
We agree that whether a claimant suffered loss of
employment opportunities or lifestyle opportunities or
3. 50% disability, $50,000
4. 25% disability, $25,000.
755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/18-1.1 (West 1992).
152. Statutory Custodial Claims: Senate Transcript on S. 1523, 87th General
Assembly (May 13, 1992) (enacted).
153. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/18-1.1 (West 1992).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. 600 N.E.2d 899 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
157. Id. at 900-01:
158. Id. at 900.
159. Id. at 901.
160. Id.
161. 645 N.E.2d 1026 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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emotional distress is probative, but we do not read the
statute to mean that a claimant may not recover in the
absence of those factors. And we do not agree that a
claimant must show "full-time service. "162
In Rollins, the caregiving sister had been compensated during the
lifetime of her disabled relative, and the heirs claimed that this
compensation was all that was required because the decedent had not
intended to pay any more than that amount. 163 The court refused to
consider the heirs' argument and, although the claimant appeared to
meet most of the requirements, it disallowed the claim because of a
lack of proof.'" The court gave its own opinion on the requirements
set forth in the statute, holding that claimants do not need to prove
they spent every waking minute tending to the needs of the disabled
person. However, they must show that they did more than merely
"care" for the disabled person. 65 Moreover, claimants must show
that the requisite care was extended to someone who was at least
twenty-five percent disabled. 66 The claimant in Rollins failed to
satisfy both of these requirements, and her claim was denied. 1
67
In 1999, the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with an allegation
that the statute was unconstitutional. In Estate of Gebis,168 a son and
daughter had acted as co-guardians for their mother, and upon the
mother's death, the son filed a claim in the guardianship proceeding
based on the statute. The court, however, did not reach the issue of
constitutionalitybecause the guardianship court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction to decide the case. 169 Instead, the case was remanded. 7
At the original hearing in the trial court, the sister alleged that the
statute was unconstitutional in'that it violated both substantive and
procedural due process principles, the equal protection clause, the
prohibition against special legislation, and the separation of powers
doctrine. The trial court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss
based on its finding that the statute was, in fact, unconstitutional. '
71
Because the court lacked jurisdiction, the Illinois Supreme Court
reversed the decision 172 and the case has not yet reached the court
through the proper channels. Gebis has been the only case involving
162. Id. at 1033.
163. Id. at 1034.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Estate of Rollins, 645 N.E.2d 1026 (I11. App. Ct. 1995).
167. Id.
168. 710 N.E.2d 385 (I11. 999)
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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the statute to reach the Illinois Supreme Court. However, a critical
reading of the cases leads to the conclusion that despite the liberality
and innovation of the statute, family caregivers will still face
insurmountable obstacles in obtaining compensation for the valuable
services they render.
B. Advantages of the Illinois Statute
The Illinois statute is a decisive step in the right direction. One
beneficial aspect of the statute is that it does not require the family
caregiver to prove the existence ofan express contract. Removing the
requirement of proving a pre-existing agreement on the compensation
scheme is a much more favorable solution to the recovery issue,
because such agreements rarely exist. 7 3 Instead, caregivers must
show that they lived with the care recipient and provided the needed
care for the requisite period of time: three years. 74 The caregiver
must also prove that the care recipient is at least twenty-five percent
disabled.17' If the caregiver proves the necessary elements, then he or
she will have an automatic right to make a claim against the estate. 176
Another benefit of the statute is that the caregiver is treated as an
actual creditor of the estate. In fact, the court in Estate of Gebis noted
that "[s]tatutory custodial claims currently share first priority with
funeral and burial expenses and administration expenses.""' This
gives caregivers equal standing with other end-of-life creditors, thus
avoiding the potential depletion of the estate assets before they are
compensated.
A third advantage of the Illinois statute is that it considers various
negative effects of providing care on the caregiver. The statute
specifically recognizes that a caregiver may suffer lost employment
opportunities, lifestyle opportunities and emotional distress, which
are all factors that recent studies have shown take an extreme toll on
family caregivers. 17S Explicitly recognizing that these "costs" exist
may have the added benefit of validating caregivers, as well as
providing additional incentives for continued care.
Finally, the Illinois statute provides the financial incentives
necessary to encourage family members to provide care to their
173. See supra note 114.
174. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/18-1.1 (West 1992). See supra note 151 for
full text of the statute.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Gebis, 710 N.E.2d at 389.
178. 755 Ill. Conp. Stat. Ann. 5/18-1.1 (West 1992). See supra note 151 for full
text of the statue; Berg-Weger, supra note 26 at 13-14; The MetLife Juggling Act
Study, Balancing Caregiving with Work and the Costs Involved, supra note 14.
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relatives. There is a direct financial reward for "dedicating"'79 their
lives to their relatives. This financial reward is explicit and provides
concrete figures to family members. The family caregivers know how
much they are entitled to receive and are also given a bottom line
figure. For the sacrifices they have made, caregivers may receive as
much as $100,000 but no less than $25,000, depending on the severity
of the disability of the care recipient, provided the decedent's estate
has enough assets to pay off the obligation. This financial incentive
also encourages the caregiver to provide long-term healthcare as
opposed to short-term healthcare. Because the statute provides a
three-year minimum, caregivers are given an incentive to invest the
time necessary to assist their relative. Caregivers will not be allowed
to come in and provide mere days or weeks of care and expect
$25,000 in compensation. They know that they must make a long-
term commitment should they hope to be rewarded financially.
C. Disadvantages of the Illinois Statute
Although there are significant advantages with the statute, it is not
without its problems. One deficiency in the statute is that it fails to
recognize all family caregivers. While it does provide a means for
obtaining compensation for spouses, parents, siblings and children, 80
it fails to provide for nieces, nephews, aunts, uncles, cousins and
grandchildren, to name a few. Today, fewer people are having
children compared to the early 1900's, and those having children are
also having fewer children.' It is well within the realm ofpossibility
to find an older American whose only remaining relative is a niece or
cousin. In addition, it might be that extended relatives provide the
necessary care because it is more feasible for them than for closer
relatives.
Another disadvantage of the statute is its language. At least one
court has recognized that the statute could be clearer. 82 The statute
fails to give guidance as to what it means to "dedicate oneself' to the
care of the disabled person, and the Illinois circuits are split with
respect to the meaning of that phrase.8 3 In Rollins, the court stated
that "[t]he statute does not define what constitutes 'dedication'
beyond 'living with and personally caring for the disabled person for
179. 755 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/18-1.1 (West 1992). See supra note 151.
180. Id.
181. Jazwiecki, supra note 1, at 328.
182. Rollins, 645 N.E.2d at 1034.
183. Rollins, 645 N.E.2d at 1033-34; Estate of Hoehn, 600 N.E.2d 899, 901 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1992).
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at least 3 years."" 4 On the other hand, the Hoehn court determined
that "the factors to be considered in determining dedication are those
listed in the statute itself: lost employment opportunities, lost
lifestyle opportunities, and emotional distress experienced from
caring for the disabled person."' 5 The ambiguity of the phrase will
likely lead to much litigation, and the Illinois Supreme Court may
eventually be forced to settle the split. The unwanted result of this
ambiguity is the creation of a disincentive for family members to
provide care to their relatives because family members may not feel
assured that they will be compensated.
The statute also fails to provide factors that should be considered
in determining whether a disability exists. It is not clear where a
court should look to define this term. Examples include other Illinois
statutes, expert opinions, and other areas of the law. Social Security
laws define "disability" as an inability to do substantial gainful
activity because of a medically determinable mental or physical
impairment that has lasted or is expected to last for a continuous
period of 12 months or more or that can be expected to result in
death."8 6 Arguably, this might include old age; however, a specific
inclusion of the elderly will reduce litigation and thereby increase the
incentive to provide care.
Another drawback of the statute is that it requires the care
recipient and the caregiver to live in the same household. As seen in
Hoehn, it is possible to render valuable and needed care while living
in separate households. As the caregiver pointed out, living across
the hall in an apartment building places the caregiver and the care
recipient in such close proximity that they may be in a closer
relationship than family members who live in the same house.8 7
Imagine a house with a garage apartment that is simply a sleeping
area without a kitchen facility or other rooms indicative of a home.
Should we disallow compensation to these individuals because they
are not in the same "house" but might be in the same "household?"
This illustrates the arbitrary nature of the "living with" requirement.
The statute should focus more on the time, expense, and intensity of
the care given rather than the physical living arrangement.
As noted above, the three-year limit has the benefit of inducing
family members to provide long-term care. However, it also has a
negative effect. At times, an elderly person may be facing a rapidly
advancing chronic illness with a low survival rate. Many times, the
health of these individuals will deteriorate quickly, and they will be
184. Rollins, 645 N.E.2d at 1033.
185. Hoehn, 600 N.E.2d at 901.
186. Jazwiecki, supra note 1, at 294; 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)(1)(A) (1995).
187. Hoehn, 600 N.E.2d 899 at 900.
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in need of expensive, immediate and challenging care. Under the
Illinois statute, a relative who provides care to individuals with
rapidly advancing illnesses will be left without a remedy.
VI. AN ALTERNATE SOLUTION
The Illinois statute is a good starting point when considering
compensation for family caregivers. However, a statute which
provides compensation by way of a claim ag ainst the estate for any
relative based on a graduated scale is needed. 8 8 Such a statute should
read as follows:
Chapter _ : Compensation for Family Caregivers
Section 1. Purpose
The intent of this legislation is to provide family caregivers with
adequate financial compensation for providing any number of
personal caregiving services for an elderly relative as outlined below.
Nothing in this statute is intended to supercede any private contract
that family members may voluntarily enter into. However, if no
private contract has been entered into and personal care services have
been rendered, this statute will control the determination of adequate
compensation for family caregivers.
Section 2. Definitions
As used in this Chapter:
(1) "Elderly person" and "elderly care recipient" means any
person aged 65 or older. 89
(2) "Personal care" means assistance with the activities of daily
living, including meal preparation, housekeeping, bathing, grooming,
shopping, transporting to and from appointments, nursing and other
care or assistance with any other activity which is required or needed
by the elderly person.
(3) "Relative" means any person related to the elderly care
recipient by marriage, blood or adoption including a child, grandchild,
188. Creating a right in the form of compensation may have tax consequences
for the caregiver, however, the complex inner-workings of the Internal Revenue
Code are outside the scope of this comment.
189. Although setting a minimum age requirement may cause problems for
persons rendering care for seriously ill or disabled persons, because this paper
focuses on the needs for compensating family caregivers of the elderly, a minimum
age requirement has been selected which is seen in many studies using the term
"elderly." See c.f. Rosalie A. Kane & Joan D. Penrod, In Search of Family
Caregiving Policy, in, Family Caregiving in an Aging Society 1, 3, (Rosalie A.
Kane & Joan D. Penrod eds., 1995).
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sibling, niece, nephew, parent, grandparent, aunt, uncle and cousin.
Comment: [Legislatures should insert any appropriate comments here].
Section 3. Compensable Claim
A. A relative who provides personal care to an elderly relative
shall be entitled to a claim against the estate of the elderly person if he
or she has rendered at least 120 hours of personal care over a period of
at least three consecutive months.
B. After receiving evidence relevant to a consideration of the
factors listed in Section 4, the court shall determine the amount of
compensation. The court shall grant priority to the satisfaction of this
debt against the estate of the elderly person prior to the distribution of
the estate to any testamentary beneficiary or heir.
Comment: [Legislatures should insert any appropriate comments here].
Section 4. Claim; amount; factors
Factors to consider when awarding compensation shall include:
(1) The time expended by the claimant in providing care.
(2) The extent and intensity of the care required by the elderly
person.
(3) The duration of the care provided.
(4) The claimant's lost or diminished employment opportunities, if
any.
(5) The claimant's lost lifestyle opportunities, if any.
(6) The claimant's physical, mental or emotional distress caused by
the provision of care, if any.
Comment: [Legislatures should insert any appropriate comments here].
This statute addresses many of the concerns seen in the Illinois
statute. It neither precludes compensation for distant relatives, nor does
it significantly limit compensation based on the time period of care.
Thus, a family caregiver can give intense, albeit brief, care to an elderly
person in a rapidly advancing chronic illness and still receive
compensation. Because it is possible to collect for services rendered
over a much shorter period of time, there is no need for an express
compensation scale. The value of the services should be determined by
the judge who is aided by the evidence presented by the parties. Such
evidence could include expert testimony placing a monetary value on
the services rendered.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States is facing an unprecedented increase in its
elderly population because more Americans are living longer than
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ever before.'90 In fact, the generation of persons aged 85 and older is
"increasing at pace which will only exacerbate the demand for
healthcare and social services."' 9' As a result, the needs of the elderly
will increase, as well as the demands on informal caregivers. 92
Whether the trend of informal family caregiving can continue in the
future will depend on how society as a whole chooses to value and
reinforce caregiving behavior. 93 It has been noted that "even the
most committed informal family caregiver needs encouragement and
incentives to continue the demanding and emotionally expensive role
of primary care giver.' ' 194 The best way to provide the needed
incentives is to allow a family caregiver to make a claim against the
estate of their elderly relative. This is an expeditious way of gaining
compensation, and does not entail the red tape and limits seen in
public compensation alternatives such as tax incentives or direct
compensation in the form of restricted cash grants or vouchers.
Furthermore, it does not place a drain on the states' economies,
because the elders provide the payment themselves through their
estates upon death. Finally, a direct claim against the estate will
avoid the tangled web created by the doctrine of non-recovery seen in
contract theory.
It is time to remove the disincentives and to replace them with
incentives, particularly claims against the estates of care recipients.
It is also time to recognize the value of the services provided by
family caregivers and to reward them for the sacrifices they have
made.' 95
Heather M Fossen Forrest*
190. Jazwiecki, supra note 1, at 325.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. For those of you who may be concerned about the plight of my parents, not
to worry. I recently relented and told them they can live in a garage apartment
behind my house should the need arise.
* I wish to express my sincerest thanks to my faculty advisor, Professor Lucy
McGough, for her invaluable advice and guidance, especially in drafting the
proposed statute.
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